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1 Introduction
Nearly ten years after the fall of the Berlin wall, we can observe three dif-
ferent distinct kinds of trajectories of economic transition from socialism to
capitalism.
A …rst characteristic trajectory is that of countries of Central Europe
that started the transition process in 1990. The transition strategy was
mostly of the big bang type with the will to introduce most reforms as fast
as possible with early price liberalization and stabilization and plans for mass
privatization of state-owned enterprises. After an important initial output
fall, those countries have found, at varying degrees, the way to economic
recovery and growth. These countries are now expecting accession to the
European Union. The two most characteristic countries in this category are
Poland and the Czech republic.1
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1One important di¤erence between the two countries is the fact that privatization in
Poland ended up to be of a gradual nature. Nevertheless, plans for mass privatization
were seriously prepared. Due to political constraints, those plans were delayed for many
1A second trajectory is that of Russia. Russia also followed a strategy
of fast reform that was very close in most respects to the strategy followed
in Central Europe.2 Nevertheless, Russia has su¤ered from “shock without
therapy ” and has witnessed a continuous economic decline since the begin-
ning of transition, culminating in the big default crisis of August 1998.
A third trajectory is that of China. China has followed a very di¤erent
strategy from Eastern European countries. Its gradual approach to reforms
led to a sequencing of reforms over a longer time horizon and to a dual-
track type of liberalization leading to a coexistence of a largely unreformed
state sector with competitive non state enterprises developing everywhere
else under very deregulated conditions.
How can we explain these di¤erences in transition trajectories? A paradox
is that di¤erences in reform strategies are much smaller between Poland and
Russia on one hand, and China on the other hand, but that there is such a
big di¤erence between the trajectories followed by Poland and Russia. How
to explain such a big di¤erence?
In this paper, we try to explain these three typical trajectories by em-
phasizing the dimension of law enforcement in transition. The vision that
markets evolve spontaneously with liberalization put forward by many transi-
tion experts neglects another spontaneous emergence, namely that of criminal
activity predating on private producers. Such a phenomenon reminds us of
the importance of law enforcement to protect private economic activity from
predatory behavior. This dimension has played a critical role in the takeo¤
of industrialization in economic history (North, 1990) and is likely to play
an important role in determining economic success and failure in transition
economies.
Focusing on the dimension of law enforcement, we see immediately that
it is a big problem in Russia with the rise of the ma…a phenomenon. It is
less of a problem in Poland and China. The lack of the rule of law has led to
an increase in predatory activities which are likely to have adverse e¤ects on
productive activity. The question is then: why is there law enforcement in
some countries and less (or hardly any) in other countries, a question that is
also relevant beyond the realm of transition economies. Since the rule of law
years. The Czech republic which, like Russia, did implement a mass privatization plan
is not performing as well as Poland. Still, the Czech republic’s performance are clearly
better than those of Russia.
2Privatization in Poland ended up to be very gradual compared to Russia. Nevertheless,
the Czech republic has, like Russia, had an experience of mass privatization
2is enforced by government, the question is then: why are some governments
too weak to enforce the law and thers are not?
One sees immediately that there is an important coordination problem
to be solved in law enforcement. This coordination problem has at least two
dimensions. First of all, for given expenditures on repression, strong law
abidance by all citizens ensures e¤ective repression whereas weak law abid-
ance decreases the expectation of getting caught and thus the disincentive to
break the law. On the other hand, coordination is also necessary to provide
the public good of repression technology. This coordination is usually solved
via tax collection, but tax collection itself is likely to be endogenously weak
in countries where law enforcement is weak. These coordination problems
in law enforcement typically lead to predict multiplicity of equilibria. Such
multiplicity mayserve as a point of departure to explain why countries with
similar reform strategies may have such di¤erent outcomes in law enforce-
ment.
However, multiplicity of equilibria does not provide us with great pre-
dictive power since we do not have well accepted theories to explain why
some equilibria are selected and not others. Can we explain why there is law
enforcement in some countries and not in others? In order to answer that
question, we would like to know whether there are institutional mechanisms
for eliminating the ”bad ” equilibrium?
In the context of transition, we identify two such mechanisms.
A …rst mechanism is what we call “dualism”, following the scenario of
Chinese transition. Dualism is the coexistence of an unreformed state sector
where the government keeps direct control over economic resources with a
liberalized non state sector following market rules. The dual-track approach
to liberalization has been seen as a mechanism for achieving allocative ef-
…ciency (Byrd, 1987, 1989; Sicular, 1988), as a pareto-improving mecha-
nism to satisfy political constraints while achieving e¢ciency (Lau, Qian and
Roland 1997a,b), and as an instrument to prevent an output fall following
liberalization (Roland and Verdier, 1999). In this paper, we point to a new
interpretation of the bene…ts of dualism in transition, namely its law enforce-
ment bene…ts. Indeed, keeping direct state control over su¢cient economic
resources to deter predatory activity is a way to both credibly eliminate the
…scal externality and to discourage predatory behavior, thus eliminating the
bad equilibrium with low tax collection and low law enforcement. This points
to an important trade-o¤ between the potential e¢ciency costs of maintain-
ing state control over resources and the bene…ts in coordination. There is also
3in the model an additional trade-o¤ between the e¢ciency losses of state con-
trol and the gain in tax distortions. Indeed, under the dualist scenario, the
government needs to rely less on private sector taxation to …nance its law en-
forcement apparatus, thereby reducing taxation distortions. This additional
trade-o¤ has already been emphasized by Gordon, Bai and Li (1999).
The second mechanism we put forward is accession to the European
Union. An alternative to direct state control as a way of eliminating the
“bad ” equilibrium is exernal borrowing. However, we show that reimburse-
ment constraints may dynamically jeopardize the “good ” equilibrium. We
show that accession to the European Union, even without external borrow-
ing, provides a mechanism to eliminate the “bad” equilibrium, provided the
“accessing” country is small enough relative to the European Union. The
channel through which this works relates to the dynamics of coordination
with the enforcement externality. Since agents can predict that there will
be law enforcement in the future, this can make them strictly better o¤ if
they choose today to be producers rather then predators. We show that this
intertemporal incentive e¤ect can be su¢cient to achieve law enforcement
today, even without external borrowing to ensure su¢cient repression appa-
ratus today. Interestingly, we show that accession without conditionality is
better than with conditionality because the latter case creates a coordina-
tion problem of its own that annihilates partly the positive e¤ects of expected
accession.
It is the enforcement externality that creates a wedge between the in-
tertemporal payo¤ to become a producer or a predator. Indeed, in order to
eliminate the “bad” equilibrium given the enforcement externality, the re-
pression technology must discourage any number of agents from deviating.
However, since in the good equilibrium, no agents deviate, the equilibrium
expected punishment for an agent who would consider deviating is higher,
yielding a strictly lower payo¤ than to producers. This interesting dynamic
coordination e¤ect with the enforcement externality allows also, under the
dualistic scenario, to strictly reduce the amount of resources that must stay
under government control in order to obtain credible law enforcement. To
our knowledge, such dynamic e¤ects related to en enforcement externality
had not yet been put forward in the literature.
While the …rst mechanism allows to explain the Chinese success in law en-
forcement, the second mechanism may explain why Central European coun-
tries are faring much better than Russia in terms of law enforcement, and
also in terms of the e¤ects of law enforcement on growth and economic per-
4formance.
Contrary to a widespread view in the transition literature, we do not
consider ma…as as agents of private law enforcement substituting for the
de…ciency of the state (Grossman, 199x; Johnson, Kaufmann and Shleifer,
1997,... ). While it is logical that businessmen develop their own private
protection militias when the state is de…cient, subcontracting such activities
to ma…as presents such an obvious holdup problem that would make most
people reluctant to recur to such subcontracting.
Section 2 introduces the basic model of agents’choices. Section 3 develops
the basic coordination problem of law enforcement . Section 4 presents the
dualism model of enforcement. Section 5 discusses a dynamic model of bor-
rowing to achieve law enforcement. Section 6 studies the dynamic analysis
of the accession e¤ects. Section 7 concludes.
2 The model
We start with a one period model. Take a transition economy where the
population size is normalized to 1. Individuals are atomistic and choose to
max
® ®U
R + (1 ¡ ®)U
P
given the choices of others and where ® is the probability of being a predator
(robber) and (1¡®) is the probability of being a producer: We denote URand
UP the utility from being respectively a predator and a producer. We assume
risk neutrality throughout the paper and we restrict ourselves to symmetric
Nash equilibria where individuals choose ® optimally given that ® is chosen
by others.
In their economic activity, agents are assumed to meet another agent
within the period according to a random matching process. Therefore, ®
is the probability of meeting a predator and (1 ¡ ®) is the probability of
meeting a producer. When a producer meets a predator, he is robbed with
probability 1 of his income: Otherwise, his income remains una¤ected. We
assume that when a predator meets another predator, their income remains
likewise una¤ected because they have nothing to rob from each other.
Income generated by private production is AKp with a marginal produc-
tivity A > 1 and where Kp denotes private capital. The total capital stock in
the economy is equal to K. Capital is assumed to be used ine¢ciently when
5managed by the state and yields a marginal productivity of 1. In most of the
analysis, we will assume K = Kp but we will see that retaining K¡Kp under
state control may have other e¤ects than those directly related to economic
e¢ciency.
We assume a predator is caught with probability q in which case he gets
0.3 When a producer is robbed, his income is also 0 but when he is not
robbed, his income is taxed by the government at rate ¿ in order to …nance
law enforcement.Taking into account these payo¤s and the random matching,
expected payo¤s from being a predator and a producer are respectively given
by
U
R = (1 ¡ ®)AKp(1 ¡ q) (1)
U
P = (1 ¡ ®)AKp(1 ¡ ¿) (2)
As can be seen, both UP and UR increase with Kp and decrease with ®.
The latter e¤ect is related to the matching assumption. Private production
is discouraged when there is a lot of predatory activity but so is the latter be-
cause there are less producers to rob from their income. The main di¤erence
between both payo¤s is the relative di¤erence between q and ¿.
Repression technology a¤ects q the probability a predator faces of being
caught. We make several assumptions on q. First, we assume there is a
…xed cost S that must be bourne before repression technology can be made
e¤ective. This speci…cation seems realistic. Otherwise, in…nitesimal amounts
of government expenditures on repression would still have some positive ef-
fect. We also assume that q decreases with ®. This is again a reasonable
assumption to make. The more predators there are the less easy it is to
catch any single one of them (like in Moene, 1990). Finally, we assume that
q is a concave function of public expenditures above the …xed cost threshold.
Formally, we assume the following functional form
q(maxf0;¡S ¡ °® + Gg) with ° > 0; q(0) = 0;
@q
@G
> 0;
@2q
@2G
< 0 (3)
Given the above assumptions, a …rst thing to see is that for a given G,
UP > UR and ® = 0 () q > ¿. In e¤ect, in order to decide to be honest
3This assumption can be interpreted in two ways: either the police catches the stolen
goods of the predator or the punishment in‡icted on him is high enough so as to o¤set his
illegal gains.
6producers, individuals must face a higher expected disutility from being a
predator relative to the disutility from taxation when being honest. The
assumption of risk neutrality keeps things simple but the economic e¤ects
are realistic.
We assume that the repression technology is such that q(¡S¡°+K¡") >
¿ 8¿ 2 [0;1): This means that the capital stock inherited from socialism, if
used entirely for repression purposes, was su¢cient to sustain as unique the
equilibrium with ® = 0, a reasonable assumption.
3 The coordination problem in law enforce-
ment
We …rst look at the case of an economy where all the capital stock is pri-
vatized: Kp = K. The government then relies on the taxation of private
income to …nance repression technology. We thus have
G = ¿(1 ¡ ®)AK
One is now facing a coordination problem. Agents will choose to be pro-
ducers rather than predators if the probability of being caught as a predator
is higher than the tax rate faced by honest producers. If all decide to be hon-
est, then even a very low tax rate may su¢ce to …nance su¢cient repression
technology to deter predators. This is the “good” enforcement equilibrium.
On the other hand, if many agents decide to become predators, they will each
face a lower probability of being caught, increasing the incentive to become
a predator. At the same time, in order to deter predators producers will
face a higher tax rate, the smaller the number of honest producers, thereby
encouraging them to be predators. We then have the “bad” equilibrium with
no law enforcement. There will thus be multiplicity of equilibria because of
this coordination problem.
De…ne ¿ such that ¿ = q(¡S + ¿AK): We can formulate the following
proposition:
Proposition 1 For ¿ < ¿ the only equilibrium involves ® = 1. For ¿ > ¿ ,
there are three possible classes of equilibria with ® = 0; ® = 1 and ® = ®¤ 2
(0;1):
7Proof of proposition 1: As seen above, ® = 0 whenever ¿ < q and
® = 1 whenever ¿ ¸ q and ® = ®¤ 2 (0;1) whenever ¿ = q. Given that q is
concave in G and that q(K¡S) > ¿ ; it follows that q(maxf0;¡S+¿AKg) <
¿ 8¿ < ¿ and q(¡S + ¿AK) > ¿ 8¿ > ¿. Below ¿, the only equilibrium
can thus be ® = 1. Above ¿, there are then Nash equilibria sustainable
with ® = 0. If ® = 1, G = q = 0 < ¿ 8¿ 2 (0;1] and q = 0 for ¿ = 0.
Equilibria with ® = 1 are thus also sustainable. Since q declines continuously
in ® and is concave in ¿; there exists a single value ®¤ 2 (0;1) for which ¿
= q(¡S ¡ ®¤° + ¿(1 ¡ ®¤)AK). ¥
A few remarks are in order. First, note that apart from the interior
(unstable) equilibrium, ¿ can be indeterminate. It can be chosen arbitrarily
in the equilibrium with ® = 0 as long as it is larger than ¿ and it is irrelevant
in the case with ® = 1. In the former case, with ® = 0, all is needed is to
prevent any producer from deviating. The latter case ® = 1 is somewhat
reminiscent of the Russian situation where tax rates are considered to be
high but are irrelevant because tax collection is low (see Berkowitz and Li,
1997). It seems reasonable that the tax rate is not determinate. Indeed,
countries where one observes law enforcement are not necessarily countries
with a big size of government. However, from the point of view of welfare,
in the framework of the model, it is best to set ¿ as small as possible.
The multiplicity of equilibria is related to two externalities: the …scal
externality and the enforcement externality (Moene, 1990). The …scal ex-
ternality is due to the fact that people’s choice of becoming a predator or
a producer a¤ects the tax base which in turn a¤ects individual choices, and
so on. It should be noted that these externalities are however not su¢cient
conditions to generate multiplicity. The ® = 1 equilibrium can be eliminated
if one assumes for example Inada conditions in private output and another
assumption than random matching so that one has a strict incentive to devi-
ate from ® = 1: (see for example Savvateev, 1998). In the current framework,
the marginal product remains bounded at A and nobody has an incentive to
become a producer if surrounded by predators.
The multiplicity of equilibria should nevertheless be seen as relevant to
understanding transition. Indeed, the massive societal change creates a huge
coordination problem and coordination in law enforcement is one of the im-
portant coordination problems. Russia can be seen as an example of the
bad equilibrium where there is little law enforcement and where predatory
activities have an adverse e¤ect on productive activity. Poland, and Cen-
tral European countries candidates for accession to the European Union are
8examples of the good equilibrium.
Multiple equilibria are also present in the model of Johnson, Kaufmann
and Shleifer (1997) where the government and uno¢cial protection agencies
compete to provide protection to …rms. Because of …scal externalities, there
can be an equilibrium where producers pay their taxes and are protected by
government and an equilibrium where it is to weak to outcompete private
provision of protection.
Several questions are however raised:
-Can we know something about the selection of equilibria?
- Are there transition strategies that eliminate the multiplicity of equilib-
ria?
In the rest of the paper, we focus on the latter question.
4 Dualism as instrument for credible law en-
forcement.
An important reason for the …scal externality is that massive transfer of
ownership into private hands gives the government access to an e¢cient re-
pression technology only if it is able to collect su¢cient tax revenues. This
massive transfer may be the deliberate e¤ect of policies of mass privatization
to ”get the state out of the economy” or of simple state collapse and private
rent-grabbing. The outcome is the same. The bad equilibrium can therefore
not be excluded since the government cannot levy taxes when private agents
choose to be predators.
4.1 Solving the coordination problem via government
control.
One possible way of eliminating the bad equilibrium is if the state keeps direct
control over enough resources so as to keep a su¢ciently e¤ective repression
apparatus. Even though such apolicy is costly in terms ofeconomic e¢ciency,
it may be an important instrument for overcoming the coordination problem.
The following proposition shows speci…cally how this works.
9Proposition 2 If K ¡ Kp > S + ° is left under state control and used to
…nance G, then there are only equilibria with ® = 0 provided ¿ is low enough.
Welfare is maximized at ¿ = 0. Compared to the “good ” equilibrium (® = 0)
under multiplicity, this equilibrium involves e¢ciency losses but economies
in tax distortions.
Proof of proposition 2: Since 8Kp < K¡(S+°), q(¡S¡°+K¡Kp) >
0, it is always possible to set ¿ < q, in which case either ® = 1 or any ® > 0
cannot be an equilibrium since UR < UP. UP is maximized at ¿ = 0. Thus,
as long as K ¡ Kp = S + ° + " > 0 for any " > 0, the good equilibrium can
be sustained and the bad equilibrium eliminated.
In terms of welfare, implementing q(¡S¡°+K¡Kp) involves a trade-o¤
between e¢ciency losses and economies in tax distortions. Welfare is equal
to A(K¡S¡°¡") compared to (1¡¿)AK under the good equilibrium with
® = 0 under full privatization where ¿ = q(¡S ¡ " + ¿AK) is, according to
proposition 1, the minimum tax rate compatible with the good equilibrium
and full privatization. Thus ¿ =
q¡1(¿)+S+"
AK :
q¡1(¿)
AK is a measure of the tax
distortion. With no tax distortion under full privatization, the welfare loss is
only of S which is unambiguously smaller than A(S +° +") the welfare loss
under partial privatization. (A ¡ 1)(S + ") is then the e¢ciency cost of the
public sector while A° is the cost paid to eliminate the coordination problem
due to the enforcement externality. Due to the tax distortion, (1 ¡ ¿)AK <
(1¡ S+"
AK )AK the welfare level without tax distortion. If the tax distortion is
small enough welfare is higher under full privatization, otherwise it may be
smaller ¥.
Note that using state control over resources is by assumption ine¢cient
since the marginal product is smaller than 1. The higher A, the higher the
cost of not privatizing and the higher the welfare di¤erence between the good
equilibrium under multiplicity and the unique equilibrium under incomplete
privatization. However, there is a bene…t to state control, namely the elimi-
nation of the bad equilibrium. This e¤ect of state control over resources as
opposed to state taxation has not been put forward in the literature so far.
There is also a second bene…t, namely the economy in tax distortion as in
Gordon, Bai and Li (1998).
In equilibrium, q is strictly greater than ¿ and UP is strictly greater than
UR. This wedge is necessary to prevent deviations from the enforcement
10equilibrium. However, this wedge will play an important role later when we
extend the model to a dynamic model.
With the existence of a public sector, welfare is maximized at ¿ = 0
not because private taxation would be less e¢cient as a means of …nancing
repression technology. It is more e¢cient in the model. The reason ¿ = 0
is that this is the cheapest way, in terms of welfare, of deterring individuals
to become predators rather than producers. If ¿ > 0, then it is necessary to
increase q purely for incentive purposes which requires in turn that ¿ be set
high enough.
Proposition 2 has a clear ‡avor of the Chinese transition experience in
at least two important ingredients: a) the state keeps direct control over
resources;4 b) taxation of the non-state sector is kept at a minimum level.
This dualistic feature is quite typical of Chinese transition. In China, tax-
ation is very low. Tax revenues form only about 13% of GDP, less than
Russia! However, government-controlled industrial output is roughly 15%
of GDP and government-controlled services form yet at least 10 additional
percentage points of GDP. Thus, the Chinese government is less dependent
on tax collection to …nance government activities due to this dualism, in
contrast to other transition economies where government has lost most of its
control over resources.
The literature has so far emphasized the e¢ciency and political economy
aspects of dual-track liberalization (Sicular, 1988; Byrd, 1987, 1989; Lau et
al. 1997a,b) and its ability to prevent output fall (Roland and Verdier, 1999).
Here, we emphasize the law enforcement aspects of dualism. Interestingly, a
key assumption necessary for dual-track liberalization to work is the state’s
enforcement capacity. Here, we have shown that dualism is a mechanism
to obtain law enforcement. By keeping the tax rate as low as possible, one
provides private agents with incentives to unambiguously become producers
rather than predators. This comes at a cost, namely the waste of productive
assets.
Nothing in the model guarantees that state resources will be used for
repression technology. State resources may very well be diverted and control
over state resources may be used for abuse of power. Since these questions
are outside the model, we do not want to dwell too much on them. The
model only shows some conditions necessary to obtain coordination in law
4This direct control has obviously huge disadvantages not modeled here, Tien Anmen
repression being one example.
11enforcement. Institutional guarantees for adequate use of resources would
imply for example separation of powers with su¢cient repressive power to the
judiciary arm of government in order to refrain the executive from deviating
from policy announcements, together with mechanisms for adequate selection
of policies like electoral accountability.
4.2 Dynamics of law enforcement.
The above model was static. Even though we have shown how state control
can be an adequate instrument for coordinating on the good equilibrium of
law enforcement, there is no dynamics. If the above model is repeated twice
or more, the result should be the same because there is no state variable.
In order to obtain dynamics, we thus introduce a two period model that
will be useful for examining further instruments of guaranteeing law enforce-
ment.
The most simple, and at the same time reasonable, modi…cation of the
above model, is to assume that expenditures in repression technology can
partly be seen as an investment. Many aspects of repression technology
can be seen as investments that must be bourne initially but carry bene…ts
into the future. Immediate examples that come to mind are the training
of specialized police forces or the establishment of information networks on
criminal activity. Another example would be the establishment of reputation
for e¢ciency and incorruptibility which are initially very costly to achieve
but are e¤ective means of deterring criminal activity . In order to take
into account this investment aspect of repression technology, we thus model
expenditures in the following way:
Gt = (K ¡ Kpt) + ¿tAKpt(1 ¡ Rt) + (1 ¡ ±)Gt¡1 (4)
with Kpt and ¿t as decision variables in period t and Rt the number of
predators in period t.
The new element is the last term on the right hand side showing that past
expenditures have persistence. The higher the ±, the lower the persistence.
We also assume that a choice to be a predator in period 1 cannot be
reversed in period 2 while a choice to be a producer always can, a reasonable
assumption it seems. This assumption will play an important role in the rest
12of the analysis. There will thus always be at least R1 = ®1 predators in period
2. Call ®2 the choice variable of an individual who was producer in period
2. The number of predators in period 2 is thus R2 = ®1 + (1 ¡ ®1)®2 < 1:
We also assume that undoing privatization is prohibitively costly so that it
is, in e¤ect, irreversible. This implies that Kpt ¸ Kpt¡1.
We then get the following proposition.
Proposition 3 There is a unique enforcement equilibrium with ®1 = ®2 = 0
with gradual privatization Kp2 = Kp1 = K¤
p . Moreover K¤
p > K¡(S+°+")
the static privatization level, independently of ±.
Proof of proposition 3: In period 2, an individual who was producer
in period 1 faces the choice of remaining a producer or becoming a predator.
His choice is exactly the same as in the one period model. We will thus have
®2 = 0 if q2 > ¿2. Moreover, following proposition 2, any ®2 > 0 can be
prevented if ¿2 = 0 and Kp2 is chosen such that
G2 = K¡Kp2+(1¡±)[(K¡Kp1)+¿1AKp1(1¡®1)] = S+°+". We thus
have Kp2 = K(2¡±)¡(1¡±)Kp1+(1¡±)¿1AKp1(1¡®1)¡(S+°+"): Note
already that Kp2 > K ¡(S +° +") , the static model’s level of privatization
as soon as ± < 1.
Given the period 2 unique equilibrium with ®2 = 0, and assuming that all
repression technology is …nanced by keeping resources under state control,
thus with ¿1 = 0;an individual prefers in period 1 to become a producer
rather than a predator if
(1 ¡ ®1)[AKp1 + AKp2] > (1 ¡ ®1)AKp1[1 ¡ q1(¡S ¡ ®1° + K ¡ Kp1)]
+(1 ¡ ®1)AKp2[1 ¡ q2(K ¡ Kp2 + (1 ¡ ±)(K ¡ Kp1) ¡ (S + ®1° + "))] 8®1:
which gives simply the condition:
(1 ¡ ®1)[AKp1q1 + AKp2q2] > 0 8®1 < 1 (5)
with q1 = q1(¡S ¡ ®1° + K ¡ Kp1) and q2 being the equilibrium q2 =
q2(K¡Kp2+(1¡±)(K¡Kp1)¡(S+°+")):Given that ®2 = 0, q2(K¡Kp2+
(1¡±)(K ¡Kp1) ¡(S + ° + ")) is thus strictly > 0 and 5 is always satis…ed
13for ®1 < 1. Therefore any ®1 > 0 equilibrium is eliminated and by continuity
the ®1 = 1¡´ equilibrium (for ´ arbitrarily small) is also eliminated. So the
®1 = 1 equilibrium can be considered as eliminated at the limit. Note also
that as soon as q2 > 0, for any ®1 < 1; the law enforcement equilibrium can
be sustained with q1 = 0 (with ¿1 = 0) so that Kp1 can not only be larger
than K ¡(S +° +"), the equilibrium privatization level in the static model,
but can even be equal to K. Since we assume irreversibility of privatization,
and since Kp2 < K is necessary for the enforcement equilibrium, we therefore
have Kp1 = Kp2 = K¤
p which following above’s de…nition of Kp2 , evaluated
at ®1 = 1 is then K¤
p = K ¡
S+°+"
2¡± :¥
The …rst part of proposition 3 is straightforward and just states that
the enforcement equilibrium can be sustained as unique equilibrium. The
second part stating that in the dynamic two period model, a higher level
of privatization, i.e. a lower level of expenditures, can be sustained from
the beginning of transition is less straightforward and relates both to the
enforcement externality and to the assumption that the choice to become a
predator is irreversible. The second period repression technology therefore
serves strategically as a deterrent in the …rst period, therefore reducing the
need for deterrence in period 1. There is thus an intertemporal credible
deterrent e¤ect. The assumption of irreversible choice of predation acts in a
way as a ”trigger strategy ” that allows to reduce expenditures on deterrence
today. This intertemporal deterrent e¤ect is so strong that if privatization
were not irreversible, the enforcement equilibrium could be sustained with
Kp = K in period 1.
5 Borrowing as a substitute for dualism.
If A is very high, then the above strategy becomes very costly as a way to
obtain law enforcement. It may then be better to borrow to pay the cost of
credible enforcement and to relinquish state control over assets immediately
at the beginning of transition. Such a strategy of borrowing will presumably
be easier in the case of smaller countries like the Central European countries.
We thus assume Kpt = K 8t. However, loans must be paid back. In period
1, an amount B is borrowed and is reimbursed in period 2 at interest rate
½. It is assumed that a sovereign loan is reimbursed as long as tax revenues
are su¢cient for that purpose. There is thus no strategic default. We also
14assume as above that a choice to become a predator cannot be reversed:
What are under this scenario the conditions to have ®1 = ®2 = 0 as a
unique equilibrium? The borrowing constraint already changes the nature
of the equilibrium since in period 2, the loan must be paid back out of tax
revenues from law-abiding citizens:
B(1 + ½) < ¿2AK (6)
Constraint (6) sets a lower bound on ¿2. Moreover, in the second period,
in order to have ®2 = 0, one must have:
q2(¡S ¡ ° ¡ B(1 + ½) + ¿2AK(1 ¡ ®2)(1 ¡ ®1) + (7)
(1 ¡ ±)(B + ¿1AK(1 ¡ ®1))) ¸ ¿2 8®2
Finally, in order to prefer choosing being a producer rather than a preda-
tor in period 1, given that ®2 = 0, we must have
(1 ¡ ®1)[AK(1 ¡ ¿1) + AK(1 ¡ ¿2)]
> (1 ¡ ®1)[AK(1 ¡ q1(¡S ¡ ®1° + G1)) +
AK(1 ¡ q2(¡S ¡ ®1° + G2))]8®1
with G1 = B + ¿1AK(1 ¡ ®1) and
G2 = ¿2AK(1 ¡ ®1) + (8)
(1 ¡ ±)(B + ¿1AK(1 ¡ ®1)) ¡ B(1 + ½)
Conditions for the existence of a unique equilibrium law enforcement path
are expressed in the following proposition:
Proposition 4 A unique law enforcement with external borrowing involves
¿1, ¿2 > 0 which are both increasing in B. This equilibrium may not exist if
± is high or A and K are too low.
Proof of proposition 4: In order to satisfy both the reimbursement
constraint and have ®2 = 0, we must have q2(¡S ¡ ° ¡ B(½ + ±) + (1 ¡
±)¿1AK(1 ¡ ®1)) = ¿2 while satisfying B(1 + ½) = ¿2AK. The latter sets
15a minimum threshold
B(1+½)
AK on ¿2 which is an increasing function of B. In
order to have ®2 = 0, we must thus have
B(1 + ½) = q2(¡S ¡ ° ¡ B(½ + ±) + (1 ¡ ±)¿1AK(1 ¡ ®1))AK (9)
There is a unique solution B¤(¿1) to equation 9, when it exists, (with
dB¤
d¿1 > 0) because B(1 + ½) is upward sloping in B and q2(¡S ¡ ° ¡ B(½ +
±) + (1 ¡ ±)¿1AK(1 ¡ ®1))AK is downward sloping in B. Inversely, the
solution to 9 in terms of ¿1 is:
¿1 =
q
¡1
2
³
B(1+½)
AK
´
+ B(½ + ±) + S + °
(1 ¡ ±)AK(1 ¡ ®1)
with d¿1
dB¤ > 0. On the other hand, B must be su¢ciently large so as to
induce agents to become producer in period 1. Indeed, taking (8) , following
the reasoning of the proof of proposition 3, the choice of being a producer
rather than a predator in period 1 implies that the following condition must
be satis…ed:
[q2(¡S ¡ ®1° + G2) + q1(¡S ¡ ®1° + B + ¿1AK(1 ¡ ®1)] > ¿1 + ¿2
for all ®1 < 1 and ¿2 ¸
B(1+½)
AK and ¿1 ¸ ¿1(B). This is satis…ed when B
satis…es the following constraint:
[q2(¡S ¡ ° + G2) + q1(¡S ¡ ° + B)] > ¿1(B) +
B(1 + ½)
AK
with G2 = ¿2AK(1¡®1)+(1¡±)(B+¿1AK(1¡®1))¡B(1+½) evaluated
at ®1 = 1 which gives G2 < 0 and q2 = 0. The constraint becomes then:
q1(¡S ¡ ° + B) > ¿1(B) +
B(1 + ½)
AK
It is easy to see that the RHS is an increasing convex function of B and
the LHS is an increasing concave function of B. Therefore this sets, at best,
an interval [Bmin;Bmax] in which B needs to belong in order to eliminate the
coordination problem of law enforcement. This interval may not even exist
when the function of the RHS ¿1(B)+
B(1+½)
AK is always above the functionof
the LHS q1(¡S¡°+B): Once a B is chosen , this in turn determines ¿1 and
¿2. Note …nally that whenever it exists Bmin has to be strictly larger than
S + °:¥
16The intuition for the result is the following. B must be high enough so as
to convince agents in period 1 to become producers rather than predators.
The higher B, the higher the amount that must be reimbursed in period 2.
This has two e¤ects: …rst it increases ¿2 because of the reimbursement con-
straint but second, it increases ¿1 required to invest in repression technology
in period 1 so as to maintain incentives not to become predators in period 2.
Since B increases both ¿1 and ¿2, the necessary amount of foreign borrow-
ing necessary to deter predators in period 1 may make it impossible to raise
enough taxes that period to deter predators in period 2 also. This will be the
case if AK is small enough or if ± is close enough to 1, conditions which are
likely to hold in transition economies, as well as in many other economies.
Another way of putting it is that even if external borrowing can solve the
coordination problem in the …rst period to eliminate the bad equilibrium, it
then may not be in a position to do so in the second period because of the
con‡icting objectives of reimbursing the foreign debt and of investing enough
in repressive technology.
6 Borrowing and accession.
We now take the same model as above and assume that the transition coun-
try borrowing in the …rst period has the possibility of accession to the Euro-
pean Union in the second period. This case mirrors closely that of Central
European countries like Poland, the Czech republic, Hungary, Slovenia and
Estonia who are the “…rst round ” accession countries.
It is assumed that, after accession, the repression technology is jointly
…nanced by the Union. Even though this does not re‡ect the current insti-
tutional reality of public …nances in the European Union, it is not unlikely
that such repression technology will, at least partly, be …nanced in common.
Moreover, public …nances are fungible and accession to the European Union
is likely to give those countries access to structural funds from the European
Union which can contribute to a substantial part of those countries’ bud-
get. We also want to analyze the e¤ects of conditionality of accession. It
is assumed that under conditionality, accession can only take place afer the
observation of ®1 = 0 in period 1.
Denote by K¯ the capital per capita in the Union after accession. Call
µ = 1
¯ the share of the initial country and call R0 the initial repression budget
17in the European Union. In order to keep things simple, we also assume
that all relevant variables are expressed in per capita terms. We assume no
redistribution so that the per capita income of accession country members
remains AK.
The second period constraint to induce ®2 = 0, which will also be the
constraint for the Union will be
q2(¡S ¡ ° + G2) ¸ ¿2 (10)
G2 = ¿2AK¯(1 ¡ ®2)(1 ¡ ®1) +
(1 ¡ ±)
￿
(B + ¿1AK(1 ¡ ®1))
1
¯
+ R0
¯ ¡ 1
¯
¸
As we can see, reimbursement of the debt is cancelled out since repression
technology is …nanced out of a common budget. Also, if R0 and ¯ are high
enough, the equilibrium with ®2 = 0 can easily be sustained.
On the other hand, with conditionality, when looking at period 1 choices,
we must look at the consequences of not meeting conditionality. We use
the superscripts a for accession (®1 = 0) and na to indicate no accession
(®1 > 0).
Conditional on ®1 = 0; a producer who chooses to be a producer in period
2 gets AK(1¡¿1)+(1¡®a
2)AK(1¡¿a
2) whereas if he chooses to be a predator
in period 2, he gets AK(1¡¿1)+(1¡®a
2)AK(1¡qa
2). When condition 10 is
met, the payo¤ of the former is higher than of the latter. However, if ®1 > 0,
conditionality implies that accession will not take place. In that case, a
producer in period 1 gets (1 ¡ ®1)[AK(1 ¡ ¿1) + (1 ¡ ®na
2 )AK(1 ¡ ¿na
2 )] if
he chooses to be a producer in period 2 and gets (1 ¡ ®1)[AK(1 ¡ ¿1) +
(1¡®na
2 )AK(1¡qna
2 )] if he chooses to be a predator in period 2. In order to
compute the equilibrium, we need to know what happens outside equilibrium,
i.e. outside accession. Since there are multiple equilibria in period 2, we will
assume a probability º of the bad equilibrium with ®na
2 = 1 and a probability
(1 ¡ º) of the good equilibrium with ®na
2 = 0. Another possibility would be
to assume that privatization is undone but that does not seem to be a very
realistic assumption.
We then get the following proposition:
Proposition 5 With accession, the law enforcement equilibrium is sustain-
able as unique equilibrium with a positive but lower amount of borrowing
B (º) (with dB
dº < 0) than without accession whereas without conditionality,
it is sustainable with B = 0 and ¿1 = 0.
18Proof of proposition 5: Let us look at individual choices in period 1
given ®2 = 0 .
Conditional on ®a
2 = 0 if ®1 = 0, and the multiplicity of equilibria if
®1 > 0, somebody who chooses to be a producer in period 1 gets
AK(1 ¡ ¿1) + AK(1 ¡ ¿
a
2)
if ®1 = 0 and
(1 ¡ ®1)[AK(1 ¡ ¿1) + (1 ¡ º)AK(1 ¡ ¿
na
2 )]
if ®1 > 0.
An individual who decides to become a predator in period 1 gets
(1 ¡ ®1)[AK(1 ¡ q1) + (1 ¡ º)AK(1 ¡ q
na
2 )]
with
q
na
2 = q2[¡S + ¿
na
2 AK(1 ¡ ®1) ¡ B(1 + ½) + (1 ¡ ±)(B + ¿1AK(1 ¡ ®1))]
and
¿
na
2 AK ¸ B(1 + ½)
Recall that in the case where there is no accession, the country has to satisfy
its debt repaiements whenever it can (ie. in the good equilibrium )
The choice of being a producer rather than a predator in period 1 implies
that the following condition must be satis…ed:
(1 ¡ ®1)[AK(1 ¡ ¿1) + (1 ¡ º)AK(1 ¡ ¿
na
2 )]
> (1 ¡ ®1)[AK(1 ¡ q1) + (1 ¡ º)AK(1 ¡ q
na
2 )]
for all ®1 < 1. This is satis…ed when:
q1 > ¿1 ¡ (1 ¡ º)(q
na
2 ¡ ¿
na
2 ): for all ®1 < 1
with
q1 = q1(¡S ¡ ®1° + B + ¿1AK(1 ¡ ®1)]
19Evaluating these expressions at ®1 = 1; one gets qna
2 = 0, and the condi-
tion
q1(¡S ¡ ° + B] > ¿1 + (1 ¡ º)¿
na
2 (11)
The condition for a good equilibrium in period 2 with no accession is similarly
written as
q2[¡S + ¿
na
2 AK(1 ¡ ®1) ¡ B(1 + ½) + (1 ¡ ±)(B + ¿1AK(1 ¡ ®1))] ¸ ¿
na
2
(12)
and adding the borrowing reimbursement constraint:
¿
na
2 AK ¸ B(1 + ½) (13)
Now clearly, B > 0 in order to satisfy ??.
Two strategies are possible to keep B as low as possible. One involves
setting ¿1 = 0 and thus q1(¡S ¡ ° + B] > (1 ¡ º)¿na
2 with the right hand
side, and thus the required B; decreasing with º.
Calling ¿¤na
2 the level of ¿na
2 satisfying q2[¡S + ¿¤na
2 AK(1 ¡ ®1) ¡ B(½ +
±))] = ¿¤na
2 when it exists, we will thus have
¿
na
2 = maxf
B(1 + ½)
AK
;¿
¤na
2 g
If ¿na
2 =
B(1+½)
AK , the constraint q1(¡S ¡ ° + B] > (1 ¡ º)¿na
2 is easier
to satisfy for any v than the equivalent constraint in the case of foreign
borrowing : q1(¡S ¡ ° + B) > ¿1(B) +
B(1+½)
AK . It is less obvious if ¿¤na
2 is
very big.
Another strategy involves setting ¿na
2 =
B(1+½)
AK and setting ¿1 in a way as
to satisfy 12, using the same logic as in the model with foreign borrowing.
Using 13 and 12 as an equality and substituting in ??, one gets that B
should …nally satisfy:
q1(¡S ¡ ° + B) > e ¿1(B) + (1 ¡ º)
B(1 + ½)
AK
(14)
with
e ¿1(B) =
q
¡1
2
³
B(1+½)
AK
´
¡ (1 ¡ ±)B + S + B(1 + ½)®1
(1 ¡ ±)AK(1 ¡ ®1)
20When º increases, the required B to satisfy 14 also decreases. Note the
di¤erence between 14 and what we had with foreign borrowing
q1(¡S ¡ ° + B) > ¿1(B) +
B(1 + ½)
AK
with
¿1 =
q
¡1
2
³
B(1+½)
AK
´
+ B(½ + ±) + S + °
(1 ¡ ±)AK(1 ¡ ®1)
One sees easily that e ¿1(B) < ¿1(B) and since º < 1 the right hand side
of 14 is smaller than in the case of foreign borrowing, and thus the required
B to satisfy the …rst period constraint is also smaller. Choosing the strategy
minimizing B thus always leads to an amount of borrowing that is smaller
than in the case of foreign borrowing. In both cases, when º decreases, the
required B also decreases.
Let us now look at what happens without conditionality. In this case, the
choice in period 1 of being a producer rather than a predator implies that
the following condition must be met:
(1 ¡ ®1)[AK(1 ¡ ¿1) + AK(1 ¡ ¿
a
2)]
> (1 ¡ ®1)[AK(1 ¡ q1) + AK(1 ¡ q
a
2)]
Thus, to have ®1 = 0, one must have q1 > ¿1 ¡ (qa
2 ¡ ¿a
2). Since in
equilibrium, qa
2 > ¿a
2; the enforcement equilibrium can be achieved with B =
0 and thus q1 = 0 with ¿1 = 0.¥
The result that borrowing is smaller with accession was expected but the
reasons for the equilibrium amount of borrowing are somewhat surprising,
and in particular the result that without conditionality, no borrowing is re-
quired in equilibrium to sustain law enforcement in the …rst period. So let
us dwell on the intuition for prop 5.
Borrowing is needed not only in order to deter from predation in period
1, but also to deter from becoming a predator in both periods given the
irreversibility of that choice. Under conditionality, this is done against the
out of equilibrium path where agents deviate and where accession does not
happen. In other words, giving an incentive to an agent not to become a
predator, and thus eliminating the bad equilibrium, must be seen in a context
where other agents would be deviating, and thus accession not be reached.
21The amount of borrowing is smaller than in the case of foreign borrowing
because we must allow for the possibility of multiple equilibria in period
2. In fact, the lower the probability of the good equilibrium the lower the
equilibrium amount of borrowing necessary, the smallest amount being B =
S + °, the quantity needed to sustain the static enforcement equilibrium.5
It is interesting that with conditionality the prospect of accession does not
in‡uence the …rst period choice of agents but that it is the non accession o¤
equilibrium path that in‡uences their choice.
Conditionality is thus not e¢cient here since the accessing economy must,
in order to have access to a superior repression technology in period 2, prove
that it is able in period 1 to achieve the law enforcement equilibrium.
By contrast without conditionality, zero borrowing is necessary to achieve
the law enforcement equilibrium in the …rst period. With unconditional
accession, one can a¤ord to have ¿1 = 0 and thus not borrow at all to
sustain the good equilibrium since in equilibrium q2 > ¿2, with or without
conditionality. Therefore, as long as ¿1 = 0, q1 = 0 is su¢cient as an incentive
for all agents to become producers. In other words, the better prospects for
producers than for predators after accession are su¢cient to deter would-be
predators. The absence of conditionality maintains this incentive, even if
some agents considered deviating.
With conditionality, accession is conditional on what others do. Without
conditionality, this is no more the case. The prospect of accession itself is
what gives incentives. In a way, conditionality reduces the expected bene…t
from accession because of the coordination problem individuals are facing
in the light of accession. Conditionality creates a coordination problem that
is absent without conditionality. We think that this insight is interesting
because it shows that conditionality can be counterproductive when coordi-
nation is necessary to achieve the conditions for accession.
5If one could commit to eliminate the good equilibrium in period 2 through a strategic
move in the …rst period, then it would be possible to set B = S + °. However, it is not
obvious how such a commitment may be enforced given that ¿2 can be chosen in a way
as to make the second period good equilibrium feasible (and pareto-superior to the bad
equilibrium).
227 Conclusion
In conclusion, we want to emphasize both the policy implications and the
theoretical insights derived in this paper.
In terms of policy implications, we have shown two di¤erent institutional
responses to the coordination problem in law enforcement. The …rst one is
dualism, illustrated by the Chinese transition experience with the coexistence
of on one hand the maintain of direct state control over economic resources,
and on the other hand, a very liberalized non state sector. This allows for
both credible law enforcement while giving incentives for productive activity.
The second mechanism is accession to the European Union where we have
shown that the prospect of accession can in itself be su¢cient to lead private
agents to coordinate on the law enforcement equilibrium before transition.We
think the accession e¤ects may explain part of the di¤erence between the
di¤erent trajectories in Russia and in Central European countries like Poland.
More generally, the accession e¤ects on the success of reforms in Central
European countries has been neglected in the transition literature where
reform trajectories are analyzed independently of their international context.
As argued by Roland (1997) and Csaba (1997), the geopolitical aspects of
transition with Central Europe breaking away from Russian domination to
join the Western European club, has strongly a¤ected the perception of the
costs and bene…ts of reform in Central Europe compared to Russia. An
implication of this idea is that the comparison between Polish and Russian
transition cannot be done solely in terms of the strategies chosen. Another
implication is that Russia which lacks anything like the prospect of accession
should be compared to other countries that must …nd alone their path to
success in transition. This points to the relevance of the Chinese transition
experience for Russia and to the relevance of dualism in transition.
In terms of theoretical insights of the model that go beyond transition, we
want to emphasize both the dynamics of coordination under the enforcement
externality and the result that conditionality of accession can be counterpro-
ductive. The interesting aspect about the dynamics of coordination is related
to the fact that the last period repression expenditures necessary to obtain
a unique equilibrium create a positive intertemporal incentive to become a
producer rather than a predator. It is this incentive that allows to reduce the
amount of state control over resources in the dynamic as compared to the
static model. It is also this incentive that allows to eliminate the need for
23borrowing in the accession case without conditionality. More interesting from
the positive point of view is the result that conditionality can be counter-
productive because it creates a coordination problem of its own. This result
is quite new. Standard thinking on conditionality is based on traditional
principal-agent and moral hazard models where the country reveiving the
loan is viewed as a single agent. Whereas in many cases this approximation
may be valid, in other cases, it may be missing the inmportant dimension of
coordination.
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